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1  Economy of Attention: From Abundance to Scarcity
We often refer to the digital society as a society of abundance inasmuch as infor-
mational resources are concerned, in contrast to previous ages in which information 
was scarce, difficult to access and to disseminate. However, from the human per-
spective, this evolution may have transformed what was abundant in the past—the 
capacity to attend to information—into a much more scarce and widely distributed 
asset. If we follow the prevailing cognitivist model of attention, which postulates a 
mental architecture that has extensive computational power but significant intrinsic 
limitations in the capacity to attend to information, the formidable multiplication of 
informational content is inevitably determining a competitive view of the alloca-
tion of this mental resource. Following the social and economic logic of all scarce 
resources, we are therefore witnessing the creation of a market for attention.
According to KESSOUS and alii (2010), the term ‘economy of attention’ was 
coined by M. H. Goldhaber (1997) as a more appropriate way to discuss the eco-
nomic models of the information society than the traditional industrial and mon-
etary approaches. But the concept was not new. In the early 70’s, Herbert Simon 
had already suggested that
… in an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of something 
else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What information consumes is 
rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information 
creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the 
overabundance of information sources that might consume it… (Simon 1971, pp. 40–41).
The main tenant of this economic model is that, in an ecosystem in which atten-
tion is scarce and information abundant, being able to attract user focus has a huge 
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value. Value is therefore created not by the information itself, but by creating an 
environment capable of drawing the attention of the greatest number of people for 
the longest amount of time.
This strategy underlies the business model of the majority of successful inter-
net businesses. The crucial differentiator is not the production and distribution of 
content but the filtering, contextualization and organization of information. It is the 
structuring of content and the ability to make information more visible, and so more 
likely to be attended to, which supports the development of environments that are 
capable of drawing attention. When this is accompanied by techniques to measure, 
quantify and monetize attention, new mechanisms of trading can be developed. Al-
though this has been the business case of the media for the last century, interactive 
media allows a far greater level of granularity and precision in the measurement 
of audience focus. The quantity and complexity of data produced by interactive 
systems, accompanied by self-learning capabilities, also allows for a completely 
new scale of analysis—as it is obvious from the debates around big data. We have 
therefore a simultaneous movement towards an increasingly granular and individu-
al identification of attentional patterns and the accumulation of massive aggregated 
sets of user behaviours. Together, they engender an exceptionally valuable com-
modity for whoever has access to it. There is therefore a definite and unquestionable 
business drive to create digital environments capable of attracting audiences and 
keeping them there as long as possible.
Alongside the new economies being built more or less explicitly on the moneti-
zation of attentional processes, there is a growing concern regarding the subjective 
perception of loss or distortion of attention. Some well known authors like N. Carr 
(2011), S. Turkle (2011), J. Laniar (2011), have articulated the emerging discomfort 
felt by many of those regularly immersed in digital activities that they are losing 
their capacity to focus. The feeling of losing agency when engrossed in digital en-
deavours, and a dwindling sense of control on attention, is reported by many users 
(Zeldes et al. 2007; Misra and Stokols 2012; Marulanda and Jackson 2012). Once 
again, most explanations of this phenomenon invoke the limits of human ability to 
cope with an overabundance of information and devices. This malaise is too wide-
spread to be waved away as a dystopian argument of ageing intellectuals clinging to 
old-fashioned models of learning and working. In our opinion, there is a true battle 
being waged around attention, with increasing economic, political and social stakes, 
and it is worth analysing some of its conceptual foundations.
We believe that the first step is to go beyond a purely cognitive perspective, 
which in our view forgets the centuries of social techniques to control and manage 
attention, and corners the issue into an excessively individualistic framework. We 
strive to put this issue into not only a socio-historical but also a political framework. 
It is our belief that the issue cannot be reduced to one of abundance vs. scarcity, and 
that the reported subjective sense of loss of focus and control that many users of 
digital media experience may be due not to the simple fact of being exposed to too 
much information on too many screens, but to the transformation and deprivation of 
the social environments that support the attribution of meaning.
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Looking back, we have always lived in excessively stimulating environments, 
both in social and in physical terms, and attentional processes have allowed us to 
operate successfully in such spaces. Our material and physical environments are 
as rich and as complex as our digital ones, probably even more so. We have been 
successful in the physical space because, among other reasons, artefacts and social 
norms have sustained the cognitive processes of attention by orienting and signifi-
cantly reducing the attentional demand of our physical environments. Traditionally, 
we have built spaces that orient our attention toward a certain direction—pulpits, 
tribunes, platforms and stages indicate to whom we should listen to and attend; mu-
seums and galleries signify what is worth looking at. We have ordered, classified 
and organized artefacts to signal their rank. In the social sphere, we have elaborated 
culturally shared signs that guide attention, indicators of social status that provide 
clues about whom we should attend to with priority. In other words, alongside the 
physiological responses that guide our attention in an automatic way (e.g. when 
there are sudden menacing noises or rapid movements), we have socially and col-
lectively generated environments that orient and support our focus. If we adopt a 
model of cognition that distributes (Hutchins 1995) the burden of processing among 
artefacts, people and organizations, attention can be seen as a process supported by 
socially constructed environments.
We would like to argue that the new economic models, which increasingly at-
tempt to exert control on what is attended to, together with the opaqueness and 
fragmentation of digital environments, have a joint detrimental effect on users’ 
sense of focus and agency. Because of their nature and their novelty, digital systems 
are stripped of the traditional signs of intelligibility and relevance, which generally 
help us navigate the material world. This means that, in many cases, we have lost 
our cognitive and social props, and therefore the competition for attention has be-
come much more primitive and brutal, and much more reliant on very basic atten-
tional techniques (such as limiting the alternatives). This brutality is reinforced by 
what Z. Bauman (2005, 2007) and R. Sennett (2005) describe as the difficult condi-
tions of the modern social existence, which put a higher burden on the individual 
as a consequence of the weakening of our traditional institutions of socialization.
2  Disembodiment and Data-ification of Experiences
There are many ways in which digital environments seem to have stripped mate-
rial environments of their “readability”, thus pushing onto the individual the effort 
to decide what should be attended: the excessive complexity of the computational 
systems that create hierarchies and classifications that are opaque in their constitu-
tion (as is obvious in big data); the increasing standardization and fragmentation of 
activities to comply with a coding logic; the expansion of the networks of actors 
and the detachment of their traces from any specific identity. These are all different 
facets of a similar phenomenon that we could call disembodiment or data-ification 
of experiences.
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Algorithmic systems, acting as new epistemic membranes, seem to increase the 
opacity of many social phenomena. They are also changing the ways individuals 
are (automatically) identified, tracked, profiled or evaluated, often in real time, add-
ing opacity (invisibility) to traditional systems of identification, evaluation and, 
thus, of “government”. Automated, algorithmic systems are increasingly reading 
and editing behaviours, screening emotions, and calculating and measuring bodies, 
in order to profile users and to select the most appropriate information to display 
or decisions to propose. However, contrary to more classical social mechanisms 
of socialization and control, these systems are invisible and unintelligible as far as 
their actors and their normative frames are concerned. What is certain is that these 
processes challenge the notion of ‘alterity’, since they function on a principle of 
similarity—drawing profiles on what is common between individuals and similar 
others. In so doing, they raise the question of the possibility of an ‘agora’ as a space 
of difference and multiple “others”.
Control of attention is overtly fought over in the arena of consumption. For com-
panies to succeed, it is vital to master and anticipate the intentions of consumers. 
Understanding and predicting intentions displaces the technological objective from 
the current world, which needs to be organized and structured, to the future one, 
which needs to be discovered and possibly fabricated and controlled. The traces that 
consumers leave behind, and that are constantly combined with the traces of similar 
individuals, allow this reconfiguration of the future. They not only help to generate 
profiles of consumers but also, more significantly, orient consumers’ access to and 
perception of information and thus the range of decisions they can make.
These new techniques to attract and channel our attention aim at shaping our 
intentions in a sort of prospective or virtual loop. This has two consequences: the 
first is reflected on time and the second on social relations. The temporality of con-
sumption is different from that of production. In most organizations, the digitization 
of operations and processes has been seen as a source of rigidity and even fossiliza-
tion of practices, freezing all actors in a digital cage. In the marketing world there 
is a different logic: the objective is to create in real time and constantly renew the 
profiles of consumers. These information systems are designed not to support the 
slow pace of the production process but to reflect the fleeting time of consumers’ 
attention, which must be constantly renewed and stimulated.
The identities and social relations, which emerge from these profiles, are volatile 
and piecemeal; they create categories, which individualize and separate more than 
they link and generate solidarities. The epistemological impossibility of determin-
ing what lies behind the groupings of individuals prevents any form of collective 
belonging, because the social categories and classes are essentially statistical and 
fluctuating. Furthermore, none of these categories is stable; on the contrary, they 
are permanently fluctuating. It corresponds to what T. H. Eriksen (2001) beautifully 
called “l’hégémonie des fragments”, the “hegemony of fragments”.
Alongside their opaqueness, computational systems by definition reduce and 
standardize actions. Binary systems strive to increase similarities rather than dif-
ferences, fragmenting experiences into common chunks and processes. This is true 
both “behind the scenes”, in the logic of coding, and in the user interface, as attempts 
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to thinly disguise the underlying entities with graphic interfaces cannot fully trans-
form the common operations to be performed. The manipulation of symbolic ele-
ments on user interfaces that often carry the same logic across a great variety of 
tasks (manipulating a client record in a call centre is analogous to manipulating the 
configuration of temperature level in the control of an industrial process, which is 
not dissimilar to filling in a medical form) means that, from the cognitive perspec-
tive, users are operating at an extremely high level of abstraction and generality. 
This type of fragmentation of information, combined with the processes required 
by the computational models available, often decontextualizes single elements of 
information and contributes to users’ sense of detachment. Finally, the fact that 
many activities are carried out as highly separated units and in social isolation also 
increases the sense of dis-embodiment.
To some extent, what we observe is the progressive dominance of a specific re-
gime, which Boltanski and Thevenot (1991) would qualify as an industrial regime, 
based on predictions, risk management, evidence-based practices and ‘procédural-
isme’. The virtual and the real are questioned since what we observe in this evolu-
tion is part of what Kallinikos (2011) calls the long journey of human distancing 
from immediate, social, living context through its abstraction into formal systems 
and categories or the data-ification of life. Furthermore, most of these systems are 
increasingly considering the body and its biometric attributes as the only objective 
or authentic source of ‘personal truth’, based on the central hypothesis that “the 
body does not lie” (F. K. AAS 2006). The flip side of this assumption is a clear lack 
of confidence in people, their subjectivity and their agency.
Similarly, Merzeau (2009) observes that severing digital traces from their own-
ers transforms them into entities available for administrative or commercial exploi-
tation. Unbound from the person they belong to and identify, these traces are open 
to endless “remanufacturing as new strategies and requirements emerge.” (p. 24). 
This same phenomenon of distancing and objectification is what H. Nissenbaum 
(2010) addresses when she talks about “the loss of contextual integrity” to describe 
the risks associated with ignoring identity when following Web traces.
In summary, we are seeing computational systems that develop techniques to 
bypass individual intentions in favour of bodily states and statistical averages, and 
a concurrent transformation of all experiences into fragmented elements of data. 
The combination of these two trends amplifies the difficulty of individuals to at-
tribute meaningful categories to the information they are attending to and increases 
their dependence on external mediators to filter and structure the content they are 
exposed to.
3  Interaction and Agency
The fragmentation of activities that we describe above, and that Bolter says encour-
ages users to “proceduralize their behaviour” (2012, p. 45), influences the tasks and 
actions of agents. More significantly, it blurs the limits between the agent’s actions 
116 S. Broadbent and C. Lobet-Maris
and the system’s actions, in such a way that it becomes impossible for agents to dis-
tinguish between their intentions and the system’s. In their interplay with the digital 
environments, therefore, systems’ requests for attention are more than a simple ap-
peal for the users’ consciousness; they constitute an urgent request for participating 
in the action. However, this has been the case since the introduction of partially 
automated systems. What is new, and may have an even more distinctive effect on 
the definition of self, is the fragmentation of information and activities among net-
works of people through the digital systems. The collaborative online activities that 
now characterise the majority of “knowledge work” and that are being described in 
terms of swarms, collective intelligence, critical mass, etc. are perhaps the strongest 
manifestation of the shifting boundaries of the self. When we put together a network 
of agents who are individually fragmented by their interaction with their tools, and 
who organise their mutual activities around those fragments, is there an expansion 
or dilution of agency? Is the constant reciprocal appeal to contribute with small bits 
of information, tasks, exchange, just a more recent form of labour subdivision, or 
does it fundamentally alter the self’s relation to others? Are we observing a growing 
instrumentation of relations that transforms others into data or, on the contrary—as 
many visionaries of the Internet (Rheingold 2002; Shirky 2008; Weinberger 2008) 
have asserted—the emergence of new forms of collective intelligence? The MIT 
Centre for Collective Intelligence has the following research question, which sum-
maries the issue very well: “How can people and computers be connected so that—
collectively—they act more intelligently than any individual, group, or computer 
has ever done before?”.
If this is the case, relinquishing attention to the collective flow is not a problem. 
Defending individual attention, as many popular commentators such as Nicholas 
Carr (2011) decry, is counterproductive, because attention must be renegotiated 
constantly for the collective intelligence to work. Phenomenologically, many peo-
ple are already experiencing a sense of boundary redefinition between self and other 
when they are online (Gergen 2000). The experiences described by gamers, pro-
grammers and recently simply people who are heavily engaged in email exchanges, 
all suggest a sense of flow and participation that is described by some as a loss of 
agency, and by others as an exhilarating extension of means.
In order to understand how all of this is happening, we have to refer to our ex-
ceptional, species specific (as Tommasello 2008 has shown), capacity to join into 
other people’s attention. The ability to envisage that other people have a state of 
mind different from one’s own; the capacity to read other people’s intentions; and, 
finally, the inclination to join into other people’s attentional states, are skills that 
underlie human language, culture and co-construction. Joint attention is seen by 
developmental psychologists as a prerequisite for language acquisition, and is po-
tentially what explains why humans are the only species that has developed lan-
guage and advanced forms of collaboration. It is also potentially what is making 
the hyperconnection proper to the digital world such a double-edged sword. We 
are extraordinarily capable of collaborating with minimal information on very poor 
communication channels (think Twitter or SMS), because our powers of empathy 
are so developed and our capacity to infer and project meanings and intentions are 
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supported by pragmatic processes of relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995), which, 
again, rely on the sharing of attentional spaces. It is precisely this capacity for joint 
attention that causes us to feel lost in the inordinate flow of requests, messages, 
instructions and information so well described by Gergen (2000).
Our capacity to join into others’ attentional spaces, read intentions from minimal 
traces, attribute meaning and co-ordinate around presumed shared mental states, 
means that we are able to collaborate on the reduced fragments of data because we 
can fill in the gaps. Clearly, when the experience is impoverished or the intentions 
of the other are too opaque and it is difficult to assume that the system is actually 
functioning with a principle of relevance, the communicational process becomes 
extremely costly. This cost may be part of the subjective feeling of loss and fatigue. 
In this case, the issue of attentional strain is not one of overload or excess, but of 
impoverishment, unintelligibility and incompleteness.
4  Control and Self-Presentation
It is not our intention to oppose a dystopic view of the digital revolution to an ideal-
ized era of authenticity and enhanced personal agency, characterized by the richness 
of face-to-face interaction and individuals’ autonomous management of focus and 
attention. The social nature of attention, and its role in culture, language and col-
laboration, means that the control of attention is a cornerstone of social relations. 
The computational model of information organization is simply the most recent step 
in a long history of institutional management of this resource.
In many institutions, the mastery of attention has long been one of the axes of 
social dynamics, used to extract value, dominate, create allegiance, stratify and em-
power. It is this relational nature of attention management that Broadbent (2011) has 
called “attention to”, attempting to shift the discourse from a purely cognitive one 
to a social one, where attention is a process that creates value. Teaching children to 
control their attention has been a significant objective of the educational system for 
as long as public education has been in operation. In the workplace, the equation 
between productivity and attention is deeply engrained in managerial models. This 
hypothesis is confirmed by T. Davenport and J. Beck (2001) when they claim that 
the effective allocation of employees’ attention is a key factor in business competi-
tiveness. If we look at this issue in a somewhat Marxist, Foucaldian and partisan 
reading, it can be seen as a step in the long path of the history of capitalism, as the 
contemporary page of the disciplinary conditions of life. The first page concerned 
the body and the shaping of a working force; the second page focused on knowledge 
and the development of the scientific organization of work. And now we are on the 
third page, which has attention as its object. Channelling, monitoring and control-
ling attention is engrained in work processes, rules, artefacts and now digital tools1. 
1 The political and economic challenges around attention management are made manifest by the 
way different organizations react and regulate access to personal communication channels, such 
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The design of effective user interfaces, under the auspices of ergonomic and us-
ability principles, ensures the elimination of potentially alternative perspectives or 
views, and focuses actions and reading on the prescribed elements of information, 
leaving very little to autonomous activity.
The ways in which different organizations regulate access to personal communi-
cation channels, such as mobile phones or Facebook, usually reveals deeper institu-
tional ideologies. In broad terms, we find that greater freedom of access tends to be 
bestowed on those members of an organization who are expected to be “entrepre-
neurs of the self”. In fact, providing or withholding unlimited access to potentially 
distracting sources dovetails perfectly with the larger movement of making each 
individual an “entrepreneur of the self”.
In the eighties and nineties, N. Aubert and V. de Gaulejac (2007) argued, that 
the “ethics of excellence” in people management created the moral foundation of 
a system striving to control the totality of a person. In convincing employees that, 
by working for the firm, they were working for themselves, a complete blurring 
was made of professional and personal ambitions, and companies emerged as in-
stitutions capable of mediating individual destinies, supporting self-development, 
objects of true love, and in the end the only instrument able to fulfill the need for 
immortality of the self.
This work ethic creates particular interactions between people, interactions 
marked by the constant necessity to become visible. This quest for visibility takes 
the form of a new social game in which everyone is striving to capture the attention 
of others. In a sort of Goffmanian ‘parade’, self-branding and “newsing” oneself 
are ways to occupy the mental space of others and to stay on top of the competition. 
For businesses, being always present on personal communication channels, on web-
platforms, etc., is a way to colonize the minds of their managers and to reduce their 
capacity to imagine another world.
5  Intimacy as a Defence
The new patterns of interaction that are emerging in highly digitized environments 
include the blurring of the boundaries between self and system and between self 
and others, and seem to engender a new typology of pathologies of which the most 
as mobile phones or Facebook, and uncover some significant social dynamics surrounding the 
control of this process. Rules and procedures are devised in organizations to exclude personal 
devices or personal digital activities while on the job (by blocking external websites, or internet 
access, or mobile phones). The digital surveillance of all online activities, through dedicated sur-
veillance software, can give rise to sanctions or the elimination of potentially distracting digital 
spaces. On the opposite end, obtaining “digital trust” or “digital independence” is a sign of status, 
of trustworthiness, of social promotion and acceptance. Having access to the whole range of the 
web, to personal communication devices and services, or in general being granted the “freedom” 
of self-determining when and where to put one’s attention in the realisation of one’s activities, is 
the ultimate sign of social recognition and of higher social status.
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common is what is being described as ‘burn out’. This is characterized by the para-
doxical feelings of being permanently exhausted, overloaded, under pressure, and 
yet not being able to achieve what is expected and losing productivity. While not 
new as a set of symptoms, the expectations of permanent availability and self pro-
motion associated with the professional model of the “entrepreneur of the self” has 
heightened the sense of disorientation. Controlling the attention of others, and deal-
ing with the constant solicitation of others, is accompanied by a dramatic sense of 
loss of self-direction, intentionality and planning.
The French expression of for intérieur can help us understand the human issues 
at stake here. In Latin, ‘for’ means jurisdiction. The common understanding (not 
the ecclesiastic one) of the for intérieur is the jurisdiction that each person applies 
to her/himself; it corresponds to what in social sciences is called a sense of agency. 
Managers and employees in organizations that are heavily reliant on digital envi-
ronments, such as banks, public administrations, large corporations, describe a sort 
of permanent blurring between their interior life and their life online. They describe 
the difficulty of making their for intérieur exist vividly in their daily lives. They talk 
of burning from the inside. This sense of disorientation is not unique to workplaces, 
and seems to be emerging in the home. The feeling of losing a sense of control when 
engaged with digital devices is described equally by gamers, online shoppers, video 
consumers or social media participants. Invariably, users talk of their devices as 
“time sucks”, as environments in which they lose their intentions and agency.
Another facet of the same problem is what R. Sennett (1977) describes as the 
current tyranny of intimacy—that is, the central position of intimate relations in the 
perception of self-realization. In contrast to traditional patterns of social interac-
tions, organized through distinct roles where individuals were more easily catego-
rized as workers, lovers, parents, citizens, we now observe a greater fluidity and 
confusion of boundaries. Nowadays, observes Sennett, the king is naked. Social 
distances, masks and shelters have disappeared. Individuals have no sanctuaries to 
retreat to and hide from the scrutiny of others, but feel always visible and transpar-
ent… raising obvious questions for the plurality of social identities. To some extent, 
this explains the increasing position of the home and of the inner circle of the family 
as a protective cocoon and the growing success of activities such as cooking and 
gardening, which restore the sense of duration, agency and privacy.
On the digital side, we also have evidence of a retreat into the private, inti-
mate and controllable. There is ample evidence showing that all new digital com-
munication channels, from texting to Skype, from Facebook to instant messaging, 
are being used to strengthen people’s closest and most intimate relations (Baym 
2010; Broadbent 2011; Madianou and Miller 2012). Contrary to common public 
discourse, people have not hugely extended their social network nor do they spend 
much time communicating with unknown digital acquaintances. Close scrutiny of 
what people actually do, with all the channels they have at their disposal, shows an 
intensification of exchanges with a few close ties, often less than five, leading to the 
strengthening of these relationships. A recent survey of 3,000 teenagers in Belgium 
(Gallez and Lobet-Maris 2011) confirmed the results of similar studies in the US 
(Ito 2010), showing that most of the participants had an ‘between us’ connectivity 
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based on intense chatting and messaging with the small circle of the friends they 
have in ‘real life’. The blurring of their off- and online lives leads them to consider 
the virtual world as just another social space where they can entertain continuous 
contact with an intimate group of friends and relations. This constant and ubiqui-
tous link between individuals and their loved ones is emotionally intense, and the 
feeling of always being within reach can provide a profound sense of safety and 
comfort. However, concentrating so intensely on a small set of relationships—espe-
cially when they also function as information filters, as is increasingly happening on 
social networking services—dramatically reduces the exposure to “others”.
Social media are playing a significant role in filtering information: news and 
content are chosen and filtered by friends. The much hailed principle of sharing 
interesting and relevant content with friends, a principle trumpeted as a way to 
actively participate in the making of news, is also, by a simple principle of homoph-
ily, reducing our exposure to diversity. The homogeneity of the social groups that 
compose the majority of people’s close personal connections, ensures that the in-
formation circulated within the network is highly consensual and supportive of the 
values of the group.
In conclusion, we observe this retreat into the intimate as an attempt to regain a 
sense of mastery of attention and agency. This attempt is marked by the pursuit of 
a “protective cocoon”, which corresponds to an extreme form of filtering of social 
and relational information. When digital environments become too opaque, and ex-
periences too abstract and remote, the solution is to fall back onto what is extremely 
familiar.
6  Grey Ecology as an Ecology of Agency and Alterity
The term “grey ecology” was introduced by P. Virilio in 2010, as a way of reflecting 
on the effects that the by-products of the digital revolution have on the human mind. 
In his work on the dromosphere (the space of technological acceleration), Virilio ar-
gued that just as accidents are intrinsic to technological innovation, pollution is the 
side effect of progress and, to some extent, its ‘normal’ but unacceptable compan-
ion. While many of the risks of the digital era are well known—the encroachment 
on privacy, extreme state surveillance, viral attacks, network meltdowns, data theft, 
etc.—and there is an active engagement on the part of experts, institutions and the 
public to find technical and political solutions to limit their impact, there is far less 
concern about digital pollution. In fact, pollution in the computational era evokes 
images of e-waste, old desktop computers strewn in open-air dumps, overheated 
data farms and silicon mines. But ecology does not simply refer to overconsump-
tion, toxicity and waste; it also refers to equilibrium and diversity. What we want to 
suggest here is that one of the social prices being paid for the exponential increase 
of information is a reduction in the diversity of perspectives. The pervasive and 
obscure tracking of our digital life, and its real-time transformation into a myriad 
of fragmented and contextualized profiles, creates a sort of epistemic membrane, 
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which makes social identity and social belonging less understandable and more 
complex.
In a very similar vein, D. Quessada (2007) argues that the hegemony of dy-
namic differences makes the figure of the Other slowly disappear: “It seems that 
we now live in a proliferation of differences. It is not at all the same as the other-
ness (l’altérité). The all-round contemporary exaltation of difference is perhaps the 
clearest sign of the disappearance of otherness. When humans prevent themselves 
to be crossed by a founding division, […] the setting necessary for the existence 
of the Other disappears and all figures vanish one after the other—whether in the 
form theological, political or ontological.” (p. 5) The brutality or the violence of 
this process could be related to the progressive disappearance of the social habitus 
(Bourdieu 1979), due to the extreme individualization and opacity of profiling and 
attention channeling mechanisms. The habitus was both a guarantee of a socially 
shared (class) episteme of the world and a collective protection against the world’s 
complexity and uncertainty. To say this in Goffmanian terms: we are losing the ritu-
als and the codes that, when interacting with others who are different from us, help 
us to preserve our face while preserving the face of the other—a skill and process 
which is at the very root of social ties.
Without going as far as A. Touraine (1993), for whom the rationalization of life 
has progressively destroyed the traditional correspondence between social organi-
zation and personal life, leading to a massive de-socialization, we do believe that 
there is a tension around agency in the digital environments.
According to Virilio (1995), the transformation in the sense of agency leads to 
a dramatic loss of orientation, a significant disturbance in one’s relationship with 
oneself, the others and the world, which in turn has tremendous consequences for 
the sense of alterity and for democracy: “The specific negative aspect of informa-
tion superhighways is precisely the loss of orientation regarding alterity (the other), 
a disturbance in the relationship with the other and with the world. It is obvious that 
this loss of orientation, this non-situation, is going to usher a deep crisis which will 
affect society and hence, democracy” (p. 1).
In the previous industrial age of “solid modernity” (Bauman 2001), exploitation, 
poverty and class conflicts both triggered and sustained the establishment of col-
lective movements, making possible an industrial democracy. In the age of digital 
postmodernity, any collective movement (ex pluribus unum) is difficult to operate 
due to the opacity of the ‘digital assemblage’ and to the extreme individualization 
of our digital lives. And this, as already pointed out, leads to the loss of a clear fig-
ure of otherness. For A. Gorz (1993), “Classical class analysis cannot provide an 
answer to the question of which social forces would be capable of achieving these 
transformations. There is no central front where decisive battles can be won through 
class confrontation. In other words, the front is everywhere, because the power of 
capital is exercised in a diffuse fashion in every area of life” (p. 62) We suggest that 
Virilio’s concept of grey ecology can help us to reflect on how to protect our atten-
tion, and how to restore our sense of self, agency and social orientation. Grey ecol-
ogy can be considered as an invitation to politicize our concerns about our human 
and mental resources, just as green ecology is doing with the natural resources. A 
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Grey ecology could open the door to new forms of solidarity by establishing a new 
front of collective engagement and general interest. To understand what this front 
would be defending, we could draw a parallel with what happened to the ‘artisans’ 
at the end of the nineteenth century. Over a hundred years ago the skills and gestures 
of craftsmen and women were incorporated into a scientific organizational regime 
and then automated. More recently it is our personal data, history and digital traces 
that are being captured. So now, as in the past, we are witnessing the process of 
expropriation of human prerogatives. The defence of attention can thus be situated 
in a long tradition of humanistic movements and conceptualized as a political and 
collective concern, and a new front for solidarity and resistance.
Two main observations legitimate this reference to ‘ecology’. First, as A. Gorz 
states (1993), ecology represents the tension between the “life-world” and the 
“quantification and monetary valuation of life”. It opposes the substitution of in-
dividuals’ autonomy and capacity for self-determination by mercantile, dependent, 
client relations. And second, ecology as a social and cultural movement is possibly 
the most relevant means of ‘resistance’ to digital fragmentation and its opaque-
ness. As S. Rodota (1999) asserts, ecology is a promising cultural and political 
path because it concerns people’s attitudes and lifestyles, and so allows a shared 
reflexivity on digital technologies and the pollution they engender, thus avoiding 
sterile pro and con debates. Ecology is also a means of spreading forms of cultural 
vigilance which can be promoted in schools and the media. And finally, it can di-
rect political and industrial authorities towards actions and research which promote 
“clean technologies”—that is, technologies which are sustainable in respect to our 
attention and our capacity of self-determination and accountable regarding the pro-
cesses they perform to fabricate identities and differences. To some extent, a step 
in this direction has already been taken by the European Regulator when it decided 
to introduce the concept of ‘Data Minimization’ into the project of personal data 
regulation in order to protect European citizens from the uncontrolled processing of 
their personal data.
Hannah Arendt warned us long ago that “miracles and catastrophies are two 
sides of the same coin”. In line with her concept of natality, could the grey ecology 
be the possibility of a new beginning?
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
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